Cet article expose la variabilit6 du taux effectif de l'imp8t pour la Recherche et le Developpement (R&D) dans les dix provinces canadiennes. Nous montrons que, bien que toutes les provinces b6n6ficient d'une subvention fiscale assez substantielle, pour R&D, la variation d'une province a l'autre est consid6rable, allant d'un taux de subvention effectif d'environ 40 % en Alberta a un taux superieur a 200 % au Quebec. This paper documents the variation in effective tax rates for R&D in Canada's ten provinces. It is shown that while a sizable tax subsidy for R&D exists in every province, the variation across provinces is significant, ranging from an effective subsidy rate of about 40 percent in Alberta to over 200 percent in Quebec.
INTRODUCTION
Government policies to encourage research and development (R&D) are an important public policy issue. This importance arises from the role that R&D plays in fostering innovation and, ultimately, economic growth.' Positive spillovers thought to emanate from R&D mean that the social rate of return to investing in R&D is greater than the private rate of return to private companies. In several studies, Jeff Bernstein has investigated the spillovers from R&D in a Canadian context (Bernstein 1988 (Bernstein , 1989 (Bernstein , 1996 Bernstein and Yan 1997) . His estimates consistently show that domestic spillovers from R&D are positive and significant, with the social rate of return exceeding the private rate of return by a factor of two or more in most As will be elaborated upon below, the munificence of R&D incentives in Canada arises in large part from the generosity of tax provisions offered by the federal government. However, what is perhaps not well recognized is that some Canadian provinces also offer generous tax incentives for R&D. Moreover, these tax incentives differ significantly across the provinces and, as a result, the tax/ subsidy landscape for R&D varies widely across the country.
The purpose of this paper is to document the extent of this variation. To demonstrate this, calculations of marginal effective tax/subsidy rates for R&D are presented for Canada's ten provinces.
These calculations are based upon a methodology for measuring effective tax rates that takes the intangible nature of R&D capital explicitly into account.
The results are quite startling. It is shown that the effective tax rate on R&D is highly negative in all of the provinces, indicating the presence of a significant tax subsidy for investment in R&D.
However, the size of the subsidy varies substantially, ranging from an effective tax rate of -35 percent in Prince Edward Island, -40 percent in Alberta, to a remarkable -200 percent in Quebec; in the other provinces the subsidy exceeds 100 percent. While the positive spillovers emanating from R&D justify some sort of subsidy, effective subsidy rates of this magnitude do not appear to be justified.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the tax treatment of R&D at both the federal and provincial level in Canada is briefly summarized. This is followed by an intuitive explanation of the effective tax-rate approach to measuring tax incentives, and in particular of the modifications to this approach that are necessary to account for the special characteristics of R&D. Calculations of effective tax rates for R&D are then presented for Canada's ten provinces. While the emphasis in this paper is on measurement, the paper then moves on to a brief discussion of some policy issues that arise out of the calculations. Knowing the current state of affairs, in particular an economically Gordon and Tchilinguirian 1998; and Mackie 2002 ).
Yet an important distinguishing feature of R&D suggests that some modifications to the standard METR approach are necessary in this case. This distinguishing feature is that R&D capital is intangible, consisting of knowledge and information. Investment in intangible R&D capital differs from investment in tangible physical capital in that it is a "non-marketed" input into either the production or product development process. By non-marketed, I
mean that R&D is not purchased on the market, like physical capital, but rather is produced or created Thus, in this example, the tax system subsidizes investment in R&D because the after-tax rate of return on a marginal investment in R&D capital is 13.6 percent higher than the before-tax rate of return.
There are several different types of effective tax rates in play here. As such, it is perhaps useful to pause and briefly summarize the various effective tax-rate concepts employed in the approach. This is done with the help of the schematic in Figure 1 . In the following section this approach to calculating the METR on intangible R&D capital is applied to the ten Canadian provinces. However, the calculations also indicate a substan- To put these METRs in context, consider again the example from the previous section. If investors require a hurdle rate of return of 10 percent after the payment of corporate taxes, an incremental R&D project in, say, Quebec can earn a before-tax rate of return as low as 3.3 percent and still make economic sense from the perspective of a value-maximizing firm. In the absence of tax incentives, such an investment would never take place. This is, needless to say, a substantial subsidy for investment in R&D.
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES FOR R&D IN CANADIAN PROVINCES

DIscusSION
The primary purpose of this paper is one of measurement and documentation. However, it is useful to discuss some policy issues that arise from the calculations. In the previous section it is shown that the tax subsidies for R&D offered in some of the provinces are substantial. As discussed in the introduction, the presence of positive spillovers from R&D suggests scope for some type of government subsidy. Perhaps the most fundamental issue that arises from the calculations presented above is whether subsidies of the magnitude reported in Table 1 are justifiable on economic grounds. While fundamental, this issue is a very difficult and complicated one.
Some of the factors that are relevant to this issue are addressed in a recent paper by Bev Dahlby (2005) , who looks at the case for additional provincial tax subsidies for R&D in an Alberta context.
He points to three key parameters that are relevant to an assessment of this issue.
The first is the size of the spillovers from R&D, and therefore the difference between the social and private rate of return on investments in R&D capital. The bigger this difference the stronger the case for R&D subsidies. As indicated in the introduction, while estimates vary widely, most studies find that social rates of return to R&D exceed private returns by a factor of two or more.
The second is the sensitivity of R&D to tax subsidies: the more sensitive, the stronger the case for The third factor is the opportunity cost of the funds used to finance R&D tax subsidies. Tax subsidies for R&D must be financed by imposing higher taxes on other activities. Those higher taxes come at a cost, as measured by the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), which incorporates both the revenue cost and the incremental efficiency cost due to higher taxes; the higher the MCF, the weaker the case for tax subsidies. Estimates of the MCF also vary widely, and depend upon the tax under consideration; however, most estimates are in excess of 1.4, so that raising one more dollar in tax revenue to finance a $1.00 subsidy for R&D costs the private sector $1.40, consisting of the $1 in tax revenue raised plus $0.40 in incremental efficiency costs (Dahlby 2005) . Dahlby (2005) considers the existing range of estimates for these parameters (which vary widely) and concludes that for a broad range of "reasonable" parameter values the case for a provincial tax subsidy for R&D in Alberta is weak. Recalling that Alberta (along with PEI) currently offers no additional incentives and has the lowest R&D subsidy in the country, this suggests that the very high subsidy rates in the other provinces documented above, may be excessive. However, it is important to emphasize that the research in this area is tentative and the results vary widely, depending upon the parameters.
As also documented above, the variation in the effective tax/subsidy rates across the provinces is quite striking. Independent of the fundamental issue regarding the overall magnitude of the subsidies, another issue concerns the "fiscal federalism" implications of this variability in R&D subsidies across provinces. Various questions arise in this context. Does the fact that provinces are able to set their own R&D tax incentives give rise to "subsidy competition" for R&D between the provinces (which, for some reason, only Alberta and PEI have been able to resist)? Is the resulting tax subsidy for R&D "too high" as a result? Are there systemic differences between the provinces that suggest the subsidy rates should differ? And to the extent documented here?
Aside from the parameters discussed above, some of the relevant factors include the size of local versus national versus international spillovers from R&D. Needless to say, the state of our knowledge and understanding of these factors is such that it is difficult to answer these questions with any degree of precision. However, understanding the current set of calculations of the effective tax/subsidy rate on R&D capital is the first step in studying these issues.
NOTES 'Boskin and Lau (1994) estimate that R&D in Canada accounted for about 10 percent of economic growth in Canada between 1964 and 1990. 2This data is from Statistics Canada (2004). 
Stage 1
In Stage 1 the firm minimizes the cost of producing a given amount of R&D capital. The approach followed in the first stage is identical to that followed in McKenzie, Mintz and Scharf (1997) , who developed the concept of the effective tax rate on marginal production costs. The difference here is that rather than combining inputs to produce a final output for sale, the firm combines inputs to produce an intermediate output (R&D capital) that is subsequently used as an input into production (or product development).
McKenzie, Mintz and Scharf (1997) provide a technical derivation of the basic formulas, which are augmented here to account for the special tax treatment of R&D-related expenditures. Here the formulas are merely stated and the idea behind the ETRRD and marginal effective tax rate on intangible R&D capital is expanded upon using a diagrammatic approach.
The two left-hand panels in Figure Al show the input markets for labour (scientists) and capital (laboratories) employed in the production of R&D. In the absence of any taxes, the user cost of labour is wo and the user cost of capital is rw. Note that the capital market is modelled as a small, open economy where provinces treat the cost of capital as fixed by the world rate of return on capital, which is sensible in a Canadian provincial context. The resulting input user costs then feed into the marginal cost curve for the production of R&D capital illustrated in the panel on the right, where the marginal cost is a function of the user cost of the inputs and the quantity of R&D capital produced, MC(R; wo, r.), where R is the quantity of R&D produced. Now consider the impact of taxes levied in the two R&D input markets, beginning with a demand-side tax imposed on the labour market. For illustrative purposes consider a payroll tax imposed on employers; supply side taxes on labour, such as the payroll taxes levied on workers, the personal income tax, sales taxes, etc., will have similar effects. The payroll tax shifts the demand curve for labour to the left and drives up the cost of labour to the firm from wo to Wg. Note that the entire burden of the tax is not borne by employers as some of the burden is shifted to workers due to a lower take-home wage, wn. In terms of its impact on the costs of conducting R&D we are interested only in the portion of the tax borne by business. The share of the tax borne by businesses is determined by the relative elasticities of supply and demand. Most estimates suggest that the labour supply is relatively inelastic and labour demand quite elastic. This suggests that most, but importantly not all, of the burden of taxes levied on labour falls on workers. A review of the empirical literature by Dahlby (1992) suggests that about 70 percent of taxes levied on labour are borne by workers and 30 percent by businesses. The key point is that some of the burden of the tax falls on business, driving up the user cost of labour from wo to w,. The marginal effective tax rate on labour is then equal to the percentage increase in the user cost of labour to firms, zL=(Wg-wo)/Wo. Thus, we can write the gross-of-tax user cost of labour as a function of the METR on labour, or w=wo(1 +z).
CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY -ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXXI, NO. 1 2005 In the above discussion it is assumed that the various taxes imposed on the R&D inputs increased the user costs of those inputs to the firm, and therefore increased the marginal costs of producing a unit of R&D capital. The calculations discussed in the text indicate that federal and provincial taxes in Canada actually act as subsidies to labour and capital, lowering the user costs and reducing the marginal costs of producing R&D capital. In this case, the curves shift in the other direction, lowering the gross-of-tax user costs of labour and capital to businesses and reducing marginal R&D costs.
The above discussion assumes two broad inputs into the production of in-house R&D. The empirical application in the text includes five different inputs. For each input the effective tax rates reflect both federal and provincial tax bases. For completeness the formulas for the gross-of-tax user costs, which are used in the derivation of the METR on each input, are produced (but not derived) below.
Labour
The net-of-tax cost of labour (wo) is normalized to one.
For all provinces except Ontario, gross-of-tax wages are: wg = (l+tL) where tL is the effective payroll tax rate, 0p is the provincial R&D tax credit rate and of is the federal R&D tax credit rate. 
Equipment
For equipment the net-of-tax user cost (rw) is r-8E-Xt, where r is the cost of finance, 8E is the economic rate of depreciation and nt is the rate of inflation.
For all provinces the gross-of-tax user cost of capital is: r =[(rf-8E-i)(A+tc(1-up-uf)( 1-0p-df)/(rf+8E)]/(1-U-U-Uf)
where tc is the capital tax rate.
For all provinces except Ontario and Quebec the term A is:
A=(l1+tE)(1-Up-U,)(1-0p-Of)ZE where tE is the sales tax rate on equipment and ZE is the present value of tax depreciation deductions on equipment.
For Ontario:
A=( l+tE)( -Up-Uf(1 +S)-( l-Up-Uf)Of+UpUfS)ZE For Quebec:
A=(1+tE)(1-up-u-u,)( 1-,)ZE
Buildings
For buildings the net-of-tax user cost (rw) is r-8B-rt, where r is the cost of finance, 8B is the economic rate of depreciation and in is the rate of inflation. r = [(rf-SE-rC)(A+tc( 1-up-U,)/(rf+8E)]/( 1-U p-Uf)
where A=l-(up-uf)Z,, with Z, the present value of tax depreciation deductions on buildings.
Stage 2
In Stage 2 the intangible R&D capital produced in Stage 1 is an input into the production process. To decide how much R&D capital to produce the firm will produce up to the point where the after-tax marginal revenue arising from an incremental unit of R&D capital equals its after-tax user cost, or
(1-u)MR(R) = MC(R; wo(]+TL), r,(1+ TK)) (r+6) = MC(R; wo, rw)(I+TRD) (r+3), (A2) where MR(R) is the marginal revenue arising from another unit of R&D capital, u is the CIT rate, r is the real after-tax opportunity cost of finance determined by international financial markets and 3 is the rate of depreciation on R&D capital. The second equality on the right-hand side follows from the definition of the ETRRD in (Al). The marginal effective tax rate on intangible R&D capital is then TRD = (rgRD_ r)/ rgRD
